Low, Ball & Lynch’s

WEEKLY LAW RESUME

June 2, 2005 Issue   By: Ray Coates

Negligence - Superseding Cause Can Break Chain of Causation

 Allison C. v. Advanced Education Services

Court of Appeal, Fourth District

(May 18, 2026)

In any negligence action, a plaintiff must not only establish that the defendant breached a duty, but must also establish a causal link between the negligent act and plaintiff’s damages.  Even if a chain of causation is established, there are limited circumstances under California law where the chain of causation can be broken by an intervening, superseding cause.

In this tragic case, Plaintiff Allison C. was the mother of Dylan, a severely emotionally disturbed 13 year old boy.   Over the course of five years,  Dylan was placed in a number of special education schools and homes to deal with his emotional difficulties.  When Dylan was 10, he was raped at knife-point by a 14 year old boy.   This event worsened his condition and he attempted suicide on more than one occasion.  Dylan was diagnosed as Bipolar (manic depressive), a condition that was aggravated by post traumatic stress disorder.

In September 2000, Dylan was placed at a non-public school owned by Defendant Advanced Education Services (AES).  AES provided school instruction and round-trip transportation between home and school each day.   AES’s staff included two teachers, plus two classroom aides, a program manger and therapist.

Dylan’s behavior did not improve at AES.  He had a number of incidents with other students, and went AWOL from school on several occasions.  AES met with Allison to discuss how to keep Dylan from leaving campus.  AES’s policy was to shadow kids at the school, and attempt to persuade students to remain. Physical restraint was not permitted unless the student posed an immediate threat to himself or others.  If the student went AWOL, a parent would be contacted.  If a parent could not be contacted,  police would be notified.

One morning, after the meeting, Dylan used a needle and thread to sew his fingers together, and reported that he had not taken his medication.  The thread was removed and he calmly turned the needle over to the teacher.  Allison was not contacted about this incident.  An hour later, Dylan left campus despite staff attempts to persuade him to return to class.  Allison and police were contacted.  Dylan was missing for three days.  During that time he was sexually assaulted by an adult male, who subsequently pled guilty to the assault.  Dylan never returned to AES.  Three months later, Plaintiff dropped her son off at his grandparents home, where he got hold of a rifle and killed himself.

Subsequently, Allison filed suit against AES, in which she pled a cause of action for negligence resulting in Dylan’s death and injury to herself in the form of emotional distress.  Plaintiff claimed that AES negligently allowed Dylan to leave campus, resulting in his being sexually assaulted, which caused him to take his own life.  At trial, a jury returned a verdict finding that AES was negligent.  Allison was awarded $3,600,000, plus costs.  AES filed a motion for a new trial on the grounds of jury misconduct, excessive damages and insufficiency of the evidence.  AES also filed a motion for judgement notwithstanding the verdict.  The trial court granted the motion for new trial, but denied the motion for judgement notwithstanding the verdict.   Appeals by both sides followed. 

The Fourth Appellate District focused on AES’s motion for judgement notwithstanding the verdict.  AES contended that even if it breached a duty to Dylan, any such negligence did not cause Dylan’s death.   AES argued that the sexual assault was an intervening, superseding cause of the death, which was not foreseeable as a matter of law.  

Under California Law, an intervening force is one which produces harm to a plaintiff after a defendant’s negligent act has been committed.  Whether the intervening act prevents the original defendant’s negligence from being a legal cause of harm, depends on whether the intervening act is a superseding cause.  If the risk of the intervening act is deemed foreseeable to the original tortfeasor, the original tortfeasor is normally negligent.  If the intervening act is highly unusual or extraordinary, it is a superseding cause, and the original defendant is not liable.

Here, the Court of Appeal determined that while the risk of falling victim to a child molester during truancy is conceivable, it is not foreseeable- absent some prior knowledge that such a crime is likely to occur.  Based on the evidence, AES did not have notice of prior sexual assaults  in the area.  The Court was not swayed by Plaintiff’s argument that Dylan was more susceptible to attack.   Therefore, the sexual assault was deemed to be a superseding cause of Dylan’s death.  The Court of Appeal, reversing the trial court,  granted AES’s motion for judgement notwithstanding the verdict.

COMMENT

This case provides a good example of when an intervening,  superseding cause can relieve a defendant of liability for an earlier negligent act. 

____
To order a printed version of this analysis, or change your subscription information, reply to this transmission. Information regarding this and other WEEKLY LAW RESUME TM articles is available from Raymond Coates at (650) 366-4000, [email protected] or at WWW.LOWBALL.COM. The WEEKLY LAW RESUME TM is published fifty-two times a year, and is a complimentary publication of LOW, BALL & LYNCH, Attorneys at Law, a Professional Corporation, with offices in San Francisco, Redwood City and Monterey, California.