Low, Ball & Lynch’s

WEEKLY LAW RESUME

April 28, 2005 Issue      By: Ray Coates

Torts- Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress Claim

Limited To Blood or Marital Relative

Rodriguez v. Kirchhoefel

Court of Appeal, Second District

(April 13, 2026)

In Dillon v. Legg (1972) 68 Cal 2d 728, the California Supreme Court for the first time held that in some circumstances a plaintiff could recover damages for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress (NIED), as the result of witnessing an accident in which a third party is injured by a defendant’s negligence.   In trying to limit the potential universe of bystanders, the Supreme Court suggested that the plaintiff and the victim be “closely related.”

In this case, Plaintiff Martha Rodriguez sued Defendant Troy Kirchhoefel for NIED alleging that Ms. Rodriguez suffered emotional distress when she observed a car, negligently driven by Defendant, strike and kill 15 year old Catalina Macias.   Plaintiff, who was 14 years old at the time, was a few feet away from Macias at the time of the collision.  Plaintiff claimed that she shared a close relationship with Macias — similar to that of sisters. 

Defendant moved for summary judgement on the ground that Plaintiff could not recover for NIED because she was not related to Macias.  During discovery, Plaintiff acknowledged that she was not a blood relative.  However, Plaintiff contended that she and her mother had lived with Macias and her family for several years; the girls had known each other since they were six years old; and that they shared a bedroom together.   The trial court granted the motion for summary judgement, and Plaintiff appealed.

The Second Appellate District looked not only at the Supreme Court’s decision in Dillon, but also subsequent Supreme Court decisions in Elden v. Sheldon (1988) 46 Cal 3d 267 and Thing v. La Chusa (1989) 48 Cal 3d 644.   In Eldon, Plaintiff was an unmarried co-habitant of a person killed in an automobile accident.   The Supreme Court in Eldon denied Plainitiff’s NIED claim, explaining that in order to prevent an unreasonable extension of the scope of liability of a negligent actor, a bright line needed to be drawn.  The Court rejected the NIED claim of the unmarried co-habitant, who claimed a defacto marriage relationship.

The Supreme Court reiterated the need for a “bright line” in Thing.  In a footnote, however,  the Court ambiguously stated that absent exceptional circumstances, recovery should be limited to relatives residing in the same household, or parents, siblings, children, and grandparents of the victim.  Ms. Rodriguez argued that, by this language in Thing, the Supreme Court acknowledged that persons who have relationships other than blood or marital relationships could recover under exceptional circumstances.  The Second Appellate District disagreed, directing Plaintiff to another part of the Thing opinion, where the Supreme Court stated that recovery should be limited to persons “closely related by blood or marriage.”  Because Rodriguez was not related to Macias, the summary judgement was affirmed.

Comment

This decision upholds prior rulings limiting Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress claims to blood or marital relatives.

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