Low, Ball & Lynch’s
WEEKLY LAW RESUME
April
21, 2005 Issue
By: Ray Coates
Civil Procedure - Statute of
Limitations - Two-Year Statute
Bertha Andonagui v. The May
Department Stores Company
Court of Appeal, Second District
(April 13, 2026)
When the California Legislature enacted the new two-year statute of
limitations for personal injury actions, questions arose as to its application
to claims that were in existence, but were not yet time-barred under the
one-year statute. This case determined whether the one-year or two-year
statute applied to such claims.
On December 15, 2002, Bertha Andonagui fell on a metal rack that had been
left on the floor at a Robinson-May store. She filed a personal injury
action on April 6, 2004. Robinson-May demurred to the complaint
contending the action was barred by the one-year statute of limitations for
personal injuries contained in former C.C.P. section 340(3). Andonagui
argued that the two-year statute of limitations contained in the new C.C.P.
section 335.1 applied. This statute went into effect on January 1, 2003.
The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend and dismissed
the action, finding that the action should have been filed within one
year. Andonagui appealed.
The Court of Appeal reversed. The issue was whether the one- or
two-year statute applied to this case. The general rule is that a new
statute does not operate retroactively unless the Legislature plainly states so
in the statute. Retroactive application occurs when a statute revives an
already barred claim. However, a new statute that enlarges a statutory
limitation period does not act retroactively if it expands the time for actions
to be filed that are not already time-barred. Until the statute of
limitations has run, it may be extended. This is not a retroactive
application of the statute of limitations.
In this case, when plaintiff sustained her injuries on December 15, 2002,
the one-year statute of limitations applied. On January 1, 2003, the
statute of limitations was extended to two years. Her action for personal
injuries was not time-barred at the time the two-year statute of limitations
became effective. Plaintiff thus gained the benefit of the new two-year
statute when she filed her action.
The Court did note that there was a retroactive application of the statute
to September 11, 2001, victims of terrorist attacks. This specific
language in the statute revived those claims and was a retroactive
application. However, application of the statute to claims that were not
time-barred did not involve retroactive application of the statute. The
Court rejected a
The judgment was reversed.
COMMENT
This opinion follows well-established
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