Low, Ball & Lynch’s
WEEKLY LAW RESUME
November
10, 2005 Issue By: Mark
Hazelwood
Torts - Federal Standard Requires
Commercial Driver To Use Extreme Caution
Weaver v. Chavez
Court of Appeal, Second District
(November 7, 2025)
The Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety Act was passed by Congress to promote
the safe operation of commercial vehicles and to ensure compliance with safety
regulations promulgated under the Act. Pursuant to 49 Code of Federal
Regulations, part 392.14, the driver of a commercial vehicle is to use extreme
caution and to reduce speed when hazardous conditions exist. In this
case, the question was whether this particular Federal regulation preempts
California law.
On December 21, 2001, Plaintiff Linda Weaver was driving her automobile
eastbound on the 210 Freeway in Los Angeles. Traffic conditions were
moderate to heavy and it was raining. As Weaver passed an on-ramp, a car
driven by Gomez entered the freeway at a high rate of speed. Gomez lost
control, and spun into Weaver’s car, knocking it into the third lane of
traffic, where it came to rest.
Defendant Frank Chavez, a commercial truck driver working for Defendant
Villa Park Trucking, Inc., was also driving eastbound on the 210 Freeway.
When Weaver’s car spun out and came to rest, it stopped approximately 120 feet
ahead of Chavez. Chavez applied his brakes, but could not stop before
striking Weaver’s vehicle. Weaver sustained severe injuries.
Weaver filed suit against Gomez, Chavez and Villa Park Gomez was
dismissed prior to trial. At trial, Chavez admitted that he was traveling
at 56 miles per hour and was going too fast for conditions. Weaver
requested that the jury be instructed that Chavez had a duty to use “extreme
caution,” pursuant to 49 C.F.R. 392.14. Chavez and Villa Park objected to
the proposed jury instruction on several grounds. The trial court refused
Weaver’s request. Instead, the trial court instructed the jury utilizing
standard California negligence and negligence per se instructions. In
particular, the jury was instructed that negligence is the failure to “use
reasonable care.” Further, the jury was instructed that the basic speed
law of California (Vehicle Code section 22350) provides that “no person shall
drive upon a highway at a speed greater than is reasonable or prudent having
due regard for weather. . .”
The jury returned a verdict in favor of Chavez and Villa Park. Weaver
appealed, arguing that the jury was wrongly instructed on the duty of Chavez to
operate a commercial motor vehicle. The Second Appellate District
reversed the trial court, concluding that the instructions given to the jury
constituted prejudicial error.
The Court of Appeal acknowledged that the Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety
Act does not generally preempt state laws and regulations. However, the
Act does state: “if a Federal regulation . . . imposes a higher
standard of care than the state law . . . the regulation must be
complied with.” In comparing the standard of diligence between the
Federal and California instructions, the Court concluded that the state’s basic
speed law required only that a driver not drive at a speed “greater than is
reasonable or prudent having due regard for weather.” The Federal
standard requires the commercial driver to use “extreme caution” and to reduce
speed when hazardous conditions exist. While reasonable care equates to
“ordinary prudence,” extreme has been defined as “greatest, highest, strongest.”
The Court of Appeal found that the Federal regulation imposes a higher standard
of care.
The Court further determined that there was substantial evidence that
hazardous conditions existed at the time of the accident, and that Weaver was
prejudiced by the trial judge not giving the Federal instruction to the
jury. The Court ruled that if the jury had measured the actions of Chavez
under the heightened standard of care, there might well have been a different
verdict. The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment and the case was
remanded for a new trial.
COMMENT
49 C.F.R. 392.14 requires “extreme caution” in the operation of a commercial
motor vehicle during inclement weather. This case significantly holds
that if hazardous conditions exist, it is reversible error for a court
not to give a negligence per se instruction based on 49 C.F.R. 392.14.
California’s basic speed law under Vehicle Code section 22350 is
insufficient.
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